Purpose: The purpose of this article is to explore debates about the powers social workers may need to undertake safeguarding enquiries where access to the adult is denied.
Introduction
In many cultures the concept of private property is connected with notions of citizenship and political identity (Blomley, 2015) . Blomley argues that property is also linked to privacy and creates an obvious boundary of the private realm. However, in all countries of the UK and in many other countries, some state agents (including social workers in certain circumstances) have powers to enter a person's property without consent (Home Office, 2014), even though this overrides rights which are closely linked with citizenship (Big Brother Watch, 2015) .
In England, under s42 of the English Care Act 2014, local authorities have a duty to enquire where a safeguarding concern is raised in relation to an adult with care and support needs. National statutory guidance (DH, 2016, para 14.94) states that that professionals need to be able to talk with the adult at risk as a key part of safeguarding enquiries. However, in some situations social workers may find it hard or impossible to gain access to the adult at risk, perhaps because third parties either refuse access to the home or do not make it possible to talk to the adult at risk in private. We term these as 'hinder situations' for the purposes of this article.
There are strongly held views voiced about the risks of over-intrusion in family and private life when considering the introduction of such powers. Prior to the Care Act 2014 being enacted, the Department of Health (DH) undertook a consultation specifically on whether there was a need for a new power of entry for social workers facing 'hinder situations' (DH, 2012) . Overall, the submissions were in favour of introducing such a power (Norrie et al 2016) . However, in its response to the consultation results, the DH (2013) emphasised that only 18% of members of the public were in favour, compared with 72% of social care and 90% of health professionals. A very small number of lay people who responded argued that a power of entry would provide unnecessary intrusion into private life and unjustifiably extend the powers of the state (DH, 2013) . Views about the proportionality of such powers were expressed in the Parliamentary debates concerning whether a power of entry should be included in the Care Act 2014 .
Ultimately, the then Coalition Government decided not to include any such new powers in the Care Act 2014. However, the debate continues. For example, Action on Elder Abuse (AEA), a UK-wide campaigning group, has recently issued another call for the creation of a specific crime of elder abuse and for 'A power to access and speak to a potential victim of elder abuse' (AEA, 2016: p4) . The four countries of the UK have taken different approaches to legal powers supporting adult safeguarding, as have other countries. We describe these below, to contextualise the article, which focuses on the potential lessons from the Scottish legal position for English and other jurisdictions.
Legislation passed in Scotland (the Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 2007 -ASPA) currently offers the most focused response to hinder situations in the UK and it is more extensive than in Ireland and in certain states of the United States (US) and states and territories in Australia (Montgomery et al, 2016) . At the time of writing (mid 2017) the Northern Ireland Executive has yet to decide whether to introduce a power (Williams, 2015) . In Wales, professionals can apply to a Justice of the Peace for an 'adult protection and support order', which gives a power to enter in order to speak to an adult at risk. These orders were introduced by the Social Services and Wellbeing (Wales) Act 2014 (s127).
Consequently, England is the only UK country at the moment to have ruled out introducing a legally enforceable power of entry for professionals responding to safeguarding concerns (Williams, 2015) .
However, four legal routes are currently (2017) available in 'hinder' situations. The first is to apply to the High Court, which may, in certain circumstances under its inherent jurisdiction, grant nonmolestation orders preventing the third party from impeding the safeguarding enquiry. Second, if there is reason to believe or it is known that the adult at risk lacks decision-making capacity (under the Mental Capacity Act 2005), the Court of Protection may make a personal welfare order, effectively making the decision to allow access on the adult at risk's behalf, although this does not directly involve a power of entry. Third, a power of entry is included in the Mental Health Act 1983 (s 135(1)), in support of a Mental Health Act assessment or with a view to making other care or treatment arrangements for the person, but not specifically to facilitate safeguarding enquiries. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 This article will explore debates about a legal power of entry for social workers in 'hinder situations', focusing on the importance of consent, drawing on evidence and debate about legal powers in Scotland in order to inform ongoing debates in England about whether to introduce powers of entry and to suggest potential practice implications. Following a brief description of the research on which this article draws, the powers introduced in Scotland will be described in detail and a brief overview provided of the evidence about their implementation. We will highlight the debates over the introduction and use of a power of entry and other new associated powers of intervention in these situations. These sections will focus on the Scottish approach, but also make reference to the rest of the UK. We will discuss debates in relation to differing theoretical conceptualisations of vulnerability, autonomy and privacy, which emerged the literature review as of key importance, and suggest implications for policymakers and social workers.
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Helping or hindering in adult safeguarding: an investigation of practice
This article draws on and extends a literature review undertaken in the first phase of this recently completed (Stevens et al, 2017 ) study that aims to collect and analyse data about the extent to which safeguarding and other services encounter difficulty in accessing and supporting communitydwelling adults at risk, which appear to stem from other parties' behaviours, actions and influence.
Phase one of the larger study (Stevens et al, 2017) also included an analysis of part of the response to the government's consultation (DH, 2012) on a new safeguarding power (Norrie et al, 2016) and . Phase two involved an online survey of adult safeguarding managers in England and phase three described the experiences and approaches to 'Hinder situations' taken in three research sites.
Literature review methods
The literature review aimed to explore evidence that professionals are being denied access to Hand searches of the following journals were also made by reading titles and abstracts:
Journal of Elder Abuse & Neglect, volumes 1-27 (1988 ; The Journal of Adult Protection, The number of papers identified in the different stages of the literature review is summarised in Figure 1 . This flowchart meets the requirements of PRISMA (Moher et al, 2009) , though this was not a systematic review, in that no methodological criteria were applied.
Figure 1 Literature review flowchart
Background to the ASPA The ASPA introduced four types of 'protection orders' (see Box 1), in addition to a power of entry, for which professionals have to apply to the Sheriff Court (similar to the County Court in England). A warrant for entry automatically accompanies the granting of any of these four protection orders.
Warrants for arrest for breaching banning or temporary banning orders are often sought alongside applications for these kinds of protection order (Preston-Shoot & Cornish, 2014) . Only social workers, occupational therapists and nurses, with at least 12 months' relevant experience (termed Council Officers), are permitted to exercise the new powers (Scottish Government, 2014: 20) .
Please insert Box 1 about here
Early consultations in Scotland identified that professionals supported the introduction of new powers (Atkinson et al., 2002) . References were also made to key incidents or cases which raised the public profile of adult abuse in Scotland (e.g. Campbell et al., 2012; Fennell, 2011; Stewart, 2012) .
However there is some contention about the nature of the legislation which Stewart (2012) argued was based on concerns about balancing choice and safeguarding. Others have conceptualised this as
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While adults with capacity can always decline to take part in a safeguarding interview, protection orders can be granted without the consent of the adult at risk if evidence can be shown that he or she lacks capacity (Preston-Shoot & Cornish, 2014), or if the refusal was a result of undue pressure to refuse consent, under s35 ASPA (Preston-Shoot and Cornish, 2014; Stewart and Atkinson, 2012) .
The ASPA Code of Practice (Scottish Government, 2014) gives an example of what may be considered undue pressure to refuse to consent under s 35(4) ASPA, that is, where it appears that:
• 'harm which the order or action is intended to prevent is being, or is likely to be, inflicted by a person in whom the adult at risk has confidence and trust; and
• that the adult at risk would consent if the adult did not have confidence and trust in that person.' Scottish Government, 2014: p57 However, this is an illustration, rather than a definition, and the Code makes it clear that it is possible to be unduly pressurised, in the terms of the Act, 'by a person that the adult is afraid of or who is threatening them and that the adult does not trust' (Scottish Government, 2014: 58; and see s 35(5) ASPA). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 
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Overall, several studies and our analysis of the biennial reports produced by local authorities of activities under the ASPA, demonstrate there has been limited use of the powers introduced in the ASPA, although exact figures have not been produced (Ekosgen, 2013; de Souza, 2011a and 2011b; Keenan, 2012) .
Balancing autonomy and protection under the ASPA
As we note in the introduction, the debate about a power of entry rests on arguments about how best to balance a need to respect autonomy and privacy whilst offering levels of protection (Preston-Shoot and Cornish, 2014). The next two sections will present findings from the literature exploring this debate from two perspectives: one which questions the introduction of the power, and the associated orders, in relation to the potential overriding of consent, and another which highlights the protective potential. The Discussion section explores the different constructions of autonomy and privacy underpinning these debates and speculates about their consequences for policy and practice.
Overriding autonomy and invading privacy?
ASPA protection orders of all kinds are usually only sought and granted with the consent of the adult about whom there are concerns. As noted above, refusal of consent may be overridden if a Sheriff holds a reasonable belief that the adult at risk has capacity, but is being unduly pressurised to refuse consent.
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The Journal of Adult Protection Securing a protection order against the expressed wishes of adults who have capacity is contentious. Stewart & Atkinson (2012) referred to the argument that protection orders granted without consent could be construed as infringing the adult's right to a liberty and a private life under Articles 5 and 8 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), but also note that 'this assertion has not yet been fully tested in a legal sense' (Stewart & Atkinson, 2012: 172) . The potential for such infringements was arguably acknowledged in the ASPA Code of Practice (Scottish Government, 2014) , in its detailed approaches to: ensuring that adults at risk consent to the order; establishing that undue pressure has been asserted; or showing that the adult at risk lacks capacity (pp63-64).
Differing views have been expressed in the literature about the appropriateness of the balance struck by the Act and how it is being implemented.
For example, Stewart (2012) characterise what is taking place in the majority of cases (Stewart, 2012) .
Also giving a high priority to autonomy, Stewart and Atkinson (2012) and Sherwood-Johnson (2013) proposed that allowing the decisions of adults who have capacity to be overridden when undue pressure is identified indicated an unhelpful set of assumptions underlying the ASPA. Stewart and
Atkinson (2012) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 Vulnerability conceived in this way may not render the person unable to make a specific decision in Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) terms, but creates a view that people with these kinds of impairments may be less able to resist pressure than other people without the impairments. In other
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The Journal of Adult Protection   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 words it suggests their autonomy is more easily compromised. The MCA's stipulation that lack of capacity arises from an inability to make a decision 'because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain' (s2 (1) MCA) may also increase the tendency to link vulnerability to inherent characteristics of the individual. Sherwood-Johnson (2013) and Pritchard-Jones (2016) concluded that a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability, which takes into account impairment, power relationships and social context, might result in more appropriate judgments.
Protection outweighs or contributes to autonomy?
Preston-Shoot and Cornish (2014) maintained that the Scottish legislation assumes that protection should in some circumstances outweigh choice. The practitioners they interviewed, or who took part in the focus groups organised as part of the evaluation, acknowledged the dilemma of balancing autonomy and protection. However, they took the view that long-term autonomy is fostered by good protection and that the checks and balances limiting the powers of the ASPA protected autonomy appropriately and were embedded in practice. Preston-Shoot and Cornish (2014) also found that protection orders were being used as a '"last resort", with the proportionality principle generally being followed' (Cornish and Preston-Shoot, 2013: 233). The low numbers of protection orders granted (Ekosgen, 2013) suggested to them that earlier fears about overly intrusive practice as a result of the ASPA may not have been realised.
Another view, identified in some of the small number of research studies studying professional perspectives, was that risks were created because the ASPA did not contain enough powers. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 perceived that banning orders could be ineffective because the adult for whom there are concerns may find it difficult to contribute to enforcing the order (Sherwood-Johnson, 2015) . In addition, there is no obligation on the adult at risk to report any breach (Patrick & Smith, 2009 ). In addition, Ekosgen speculated that the potential benefits of the various protection orders might not be realised if they were more regularly breached 'because abusers know that there is no significant retribution for doing so' (Ekosgen, 2012: 21) , although no studies of 'abusers' appear to have been undertaken.
However, Ekosgen (2012) acknowledged that there is no evidence of this being a significant problem in terms of numbers and predict that strengthening the provisions of the ASPA would be contentious.
Preston-Shoot and Cornish (2014) concluded that, as a result of these limitations, the Act's impact was restricted to people who are aware of the harm and want it stopped and not to those without capacity for whom other legislation applies. There appeared to be no way of protecting people with capacity who choose to stay in abusive situations, although it is about whom such people that concerns about overriding consent arise, because they disagree with professionals about how to proceed.
Discussion
The limited use of the ASPA powers by professionals may indicate their concern about the impact of the provisions in the Act on autonomy and citizenship, as explored in the two research studies on the subject (Stewart & Atkinson, 2012 ; Sherwood-Johnson, 2013) discussed above, and that they therefore proceed with caution. This is in accord with suggestions of a tension between the aims of Manthorpe et al (2011) . Personalisation promotes the importance of individual autonomy and the transfer of responsibility and risk (Ferguson, 2007; Hough, 2012) . However, some practitioners believe safeguarding is underpinned by a 'duty of care' that professionals and agencies have in relation to adults at risk, whether or not they have capacity . Acquiring a legally backed power of entry and implementing removal or banning orders may highlight this tension, particularly when an adult at risk who has capacity does not consent.
Policy decisions about introducing a power of entry and social workers' considerations about whether to apply for a warrant to intervene in individual cases partly rely on the importance accorded to, and conceptions of, privacy. In an analysis of relationships between family and state, Wyness (2014) charted a move from a modernist dichotomy between public and private, towards a postmodernist understanding, which has much more porous boundaries, creating 'private' and 'public' as relative terms (Pitkin, 1981) . The dichotomous view assumes an opposition between the public and the private, identifying practices, spaces and people as definitely one or the other. This view places politics and society in the public domain, whereas families and what happens within families in the private (Wyness, 2014) . Such a construction would place more significance on a power of entry as breaching a formidable barrier. Wyness argued that changing family structures, policy and resulting professional practice have all contributed to a gradual breaking down of this barrier, although the idea of family life being associated with the private continues.
Changing family structures and less residential and hospital long-term care provision have led to an increasing use of paid care workers in supporting disabled adults in their homes (Pickard, 2015) , again leading to blurring of public-private boundaries. In the UK, recent legislation in three of the , 2015) . As we noted earlier, this requires social workers to communicate with adults in person, either in their homes or elsewhere. This is part of the legitimisation of state interest in the welfare of adults as well as children, as many campaigners maintain; for example, Action on Elder Abuse has specifically argued that adult protection needs to be given the same 'legal status' as child protection (Taylor, 2007) .
Conceptions of vulnerability were explored in the section on balancing autonomy and protection.
The debate rests on the extent to which inherent characteristics, such as physical or mild cognitive impairments, are seen as reducing the ability to resist undue influence or coercion, and therefore suggest impaired or limited autonomy. This debate exposes the contrast between two conceptions of autonomy, echoing the debate about privacy described above. The first is a view of autonomy as an inherent characteristic, which is based on 'liberal philosophies that idealise moral and political subjects as self-sufficient and independent of others' influence; subjects who are considered "autonomous"' (Series, 2015: 81) . The second starts from a view that social relationships and wider social structures can affect the person's identity to such an extent as to raise questions about whether the person's choices are made autonomously in the liberal sense (Mackenzie, 2008) . There are several linked theories taking this second approach, known as 'relational autonomy'. For example, one of the requirements for personal autonomy is a basic 'self-trust', which can be seriously undermined by certain social relationships. Self-trust can be undermined by oppression, including societal oppression of particular groups and coercion of individuals (McLeod and Sherwin, 2000) . Furthermore, Mackenzie (2008) argued that doubts are also generated about the requirement to respect autonomy where undue influence is being brought to bear on the individual. There is much debate among proponents of relational autonomy about the extent to which aspects of social relationships are causally related to autonomy (or its absence), or whether autonomy is constituted by aspects of social relationships (Westlund, 2009 ). The latter is seen as a 'strong substantive relational approach' (Mackenzie, 2008: 519) . Such an approach to autonomy can lead to justification of more paternalist and potentially oppressive approaches (as feared by Stewart, 2012) towards individuals deemed to be in the wrong kind of social relationships or contexts, or even having the wrong kind of religious beliefs (Christman, 2004) . Christman argued that it is the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 
Conclusion
The ASPA 2007 provides a wide range of legally enforceable protective measures for social workers in Scotland undertaking safeguarding enquiries. These powers are markedly different to those available to social workers in England (and other parts of the UK), which are understood to take a long time to implement and to be costly. However, there is no evidence to date about the impact of introducing a power of entry for social workers and other professionals working in adult safeguarding in Scotland from case data or from the professionals' or adults at risk's perspectives.
More empirical evidence is needed about experiences in Scotland and from English practitioners about the prevalence of cases, extent of difficulties, decision-making processes, their use of other approaches and opinions about the sufficiency of current legal powers.
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The Journal of Adult Protection We have argued here that a conception of autonomy as being in some way dependent (causally or constitutively) on social relationships and contexts, suggests that social workers need to explore potential factors limiting or preventing autonomous decisions. Such an exploration will enable social workers to consider the best kind of support required to promote autonomy for the adult at risk.
Potentially, such support might involve offering a safe place to the adult at risk to help explore preferences and to make decisions. In England, it would not be possible to impose this on an adult at risk who had capacity to make the decision about whether such a safe space was necessary and while legally possible in Scotland, there is no record of such orders being imposed. The construction of vulnerability is another factor affecting the ascription of autonomy to an individual's decisions.
Considering the balance of social causes and the impact of impairment in assessing levels of vulnerability may help social workers to make decisions about the need for interventions and whether to invoke legal powers (whether in England or Scotland). Furthermore, accepting a more blurred public-private boundary, which legitimises state interest in what happens within private dwellings, could also be used to support the introduction of a power of entry. This may be so whether there is a more straightforward power of entry as in Scotland or Wales, or in England, when decisions are made to take the difficult and uncertain route of using the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to apply for orders. Such a conception of the public-private boundary may also be valuable in developing the 'softer' skills of mediation, negotiation and assertive outreach, with multidisciplinary and multi-agency engagement and expertise needed to gain access to adults at risk in all situations. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1. Assessment orders: allow professionals to enter premises and either interview an adult at risk on site or take him or her to another place for the purpose of conducting a private interview.
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2. Removal orders: enable professionals to take the adult at risk to a place of safety for up to seven days (the duration is set in the order).
3. Banning orders: exclude a third party from a specified place (usually the home of the adult at risk), for up to six months.
4. Temporary banning orders: can be granted, pending the determination of an application for a banning order (Scottish Government, 2016) .
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